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SITUATION II 
INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS 
States X and Y are at 'var in 1934. Other states are 
neutral. States X, Y, N, ~1:, and 0 are parties to the ''r ashington Treaty Liiniting Naval Arma1nent of 1922 
and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. 
A private ship-building con1pany in state N, prior to 
the ''ar, has built for state X several 20,000-ton unar1ned 
,~essels equipped 'vith decks for aircraft landing and fly-
ing off, and these vessels have been serving on the high 
sea as stations for the regular transoceanic air service be-
t,veen state X and state ~I. 
(a) One of these vessels, the No. 5, "rhich had been 
nearly completed in 1929 but on which on account of an 
accident and labor troubles construction had been de-
lnyed, having on the day before 'var was declared sailed 
under the flag of N for state M in order to install there 
certain essential flying-off equip1nent, was Inet at sea the 
day after war was declared and before reaching state ~1:, 
by the Yoba, a vessel of war of state Y. 'l'he captain 
of the Y oba wished to convert the LVo. 5 in11nediately into 
rln aircraft carrier to acco1npany the Yoba and accord-
ntgly seized the LVo. 5 and 1nade this conversion. 
(b) I£ the Yoba had n1et the LVo. 5 after installing its 
e•Juipment in state M, and when .sailing under the flag 
of state X ,for X, would the decision be the same as in 
(a)~ 
(c) A private shipbuilding co1npany in state R has 
co1npleted a vessel of 9,000 tons 'vith 5-inch guns and a 
deck for two aircraft, the No. 6, for which state X has 
paid but which had not .sailed fro1n R before the decla-
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ration of w·ar. l .... con1n1unicates to R a request that the 
LVo. 6 be interned. 
(d) The Saba, a merchant Yessel, lawfully flying the 
flag of state S is summoned to lie to by a sub1narine of 
state X and is visited by a boat fron1 the submarine. 
State S has a treaty with state X agreeing to the "de-
liYering up" of contraband and the l\fa~ter of the Saba 
offers to " deliYer up " all contraband maintaining this 
is his sole obligation under the conditions. 1"he sub-
luaririe threatens to sink the Saba unless it agrees to 
change its course and proceed to port Xena of ~tate X. 
''That are the lawful rights of all the parties under 
the above conditions~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) The iVo. 5 was on a lawful voyage when 1net by 
the Yoba. 
The Y oba could seize the 1.V o. 5 and bring her to a 
prize court of Y. 
Except in the case of urgent military necessity conver-
sion before adjudication 'vould not be la,yful and in any 
case full compensation must be 1nade for ~'~ loss. 
(b) 1"'he Jro. 5 after installing its equipment in state 
l\I and sailing for state X should be brought to a prize 
court. 
Except in case of urgent military necessity conYersion 
before adjudication would not be lawful. 
States :X and l\1 have no re~ponsibility nor 'vould Y 
have any liability as the iVo. 5 is bound for X, a belliger-
ent destination. 
(c) The /f o. 6 should be interned by state R. 
The construction .of the iV o. 6 in sta tB R is lawful. 
(d) 'fhe Saba is under legal obligation to " deliver 
up " the contraband. The Saba is under no legal obliga-
tion to agree to change its course and to proceed to port 
Xena, though it 'vould be under obligation to go if ac-
companied by the submarine or in control of a prize cre,v. 
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NOTES 
Treaties and international la11J.-Treaty is the general 
terin used to cover agree1nents bet,Yeen t'vo or more states. 
It is understood that to be valid it n1ust be in accord with 
the la'v of both of the parties to the treaty and in accord 
"With international la,v. Other political entities than 
states n1ay enter into international agreen1ents so far as 
they haYe capacity under their fundan1ental la,v, and the 
treaty-n1aking capacity of son1e states is not unlimited. 
Two or 1nore states may enter into a treaty for a sp,ecific 
purpose ·which has little or no relation to other states, and 
·which may have no bearing on international la\\7 , e. g., 
two states might agree bet\veen then1selves as to the diver-
sion of the 'vaters of a shallow· boundary stream. Two 
or In ore states Inight enter into a treaty "Which, 'vhile bind-
ing only the parties, might haYe a far-reaching effect 
upon other states, e. g., t'vo states n1ight agree upon an 
offensive and defensiYe alliance. T,vo or more states 
might agree upon principles which should for a specified 
period or for specified conditions be considered as bind-
ing, e. g., the principles of the Treaty of 'Vashington of 
1871 in regard to neutral liability. Such treaties may or 
may not be regarded as i1nportant for international la'v, 
but they tend to beco1ne significant as precedents and 
1nay, as in the case of the principles of the Treaty of ''r ashington, beco1ne generally accepted as setting forth 
international law. 'Vhen a principle once a subject for 
treaty negotiation beco1nes generally recognized, it may 
be regarded as international law, e. g., inviolability of 
a1nba_ssadors. 
The most comn1on type of treaty is an international 
agreement in 'vhich the parties provide for mutually ad-
vantageous conduct or understandings with reference to 
one another. Such a treaty as the 'Vashington Treaty 
of 1922, limiting naval arma1nent, 1nay have been sat-
isfactory to the parties as putting an end for the ti1ne 
4418-35-4 
42 I:NTERFEREXCE w·rTH SHIPS 
to their co1npetition in naval anna1nent, and the London 
N aYal Treaty 1nay ha Ye elaborated these understandings. 
T11ese treaties 'vould not necessarily create any legal ob-
ligations for nonparty states, nor forn1 bases for prin-
ciples of international la""", though the policies of third 
states 1night be 1nodified by the obligations assumed by 
the party states. 
The states party to a treaty have an international ob-
ligation to observe the provisions of a treaty into "Thich 
they have entered, though there is often a difference of 
opinion as to the interpretation of the provisions. There 
could not be any legal objection raised 'vhen a state avails 
itself of the provisions of a treaty in accord "Tith 'vhich 
it n1ay n1odify its relations to the other parties to the 
treaty, or by actual denunciation in accord with the pro-
visions of the treaty may put an end to all its obligations 
under the treaty. 'Treaties concluded in perpetuity, or 
'vithout provision for revision or denunciation, have 
usually been causes of international disputes and 
n1isunderstandings. 
Air(ff'aft station vessel.-There 1nay be a distinction 
between an aircraft station vessel and a seadron1e, as the 
aircraft station vessel is itself capable of navigation and 
comes within the category of vessels, while the seadrome 
is a structure for a specific purpose. The status of the 
seadro1ne 'vould therefore be subject to different laws 
fron1 those governing vessels. 
''Thile an aircraft station vessel n1ight not be pri1narily 
designed for an aircraft carrier, such a vessel n1ight be 
transforn1able into an aircraft carrier. No intention to 
furnish an aircraft carrier to a belligerent could be based 
si1nply on the fact of pre-war construction of an aircraft 
station vessel of a type already in use for maritime air-
craft stations on a line between tw·o states. 
Further there is no limitation upon the tonnage of 
such vessels in any treaty, as these vessels are not con-
structed for war purposes. It 1nay be doubtful 'vhether 
one belligerent, when both belligerents were parties to 
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Hague Convention VI of 1907 relating to status of 
enemy 1nerchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities, 
would be justified in detaining in its O\Yn ports at the out-
break of \Var such a vessel under the provisions of article 
V, which reads: 
"The present Convention does not affect merchant-ships whose 
build shows that they are intended for conYersion into vessels 
(tf war." 
If the build of an aircraft station vessel did not show 
that it was intended for conversion into a vessel of \Var, 
articles 2 and 3 of the convention proYides that if such a 
vessel is detained in a belligerent port or 1net at sea and 
is requisitioned, there 1nust be payn1ent of co1npensation. 
In the discussion at the N a Yal ,,.,. ar College in 1932 
artificial structures and 1nariti1ne jurisdiction " .. ere con-
sidered and it " ras pointed out that a seatlron1e as located 
at a defined place at sea \Vould be different in character 
fro1n an aircraft vessel fron1 the nature of its construc-
tion and possible use. The seadro1ne as a fixed structure 
would haYe rather 1nore of the attributes usually associ-
ated \Vith land jurisdiction \Yhile the a j rcraft vessel \Yould 
in the 1nain be under mariti1ne rules even though, if per-
manently located at a specified place at sea, the jurisdic-
tion n1ight be soine\vhat Inodified fro1n that exercised 
over a vessel navigating under ordinary circtunstances. 
Aircraft carrier.-In the 'Vashington Treaty on the 
Limitation of Ar1nainent, 1922. Chapter II, Part 4, "Air-
craft Carrier " \Yas defined as follo\YS: 
"An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a dis-
placement in excess of 10,000 tons ( 10,160 1netric tons) standard 
displace1nent designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of 
carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can 
be launched therefron1 and landed thereon, and not designed and 
constructed for carrying a more vowerful armament than that 
allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be." 
(1921 Naval 'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 322 .. ) 
This definition \Vas replaced in the I..~ondon Naval 
Treaty, 1930, Article 3, by the follo,ving : 
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" 'The expression " aircraft carrier" includes any surface Yessel 
of war, wbateYer its displacement, designed for the svecific and 
exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that air-
craft can be launched therefron1 and landed thereon.' " (1930 
NaYal -nrar College, International Law Situations, p. 144.) 
This definition o:£ 1930 is specifically limited to " ves-
sels o:£ war " and in the sa1ne article there is provision 
that the fitting o£ a landing-on or flying-off plat£orn1 or 
deck on a capital ship, cruiser, or destroyer not designed 
cr adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, 'vould not 
rnake these vessels chargeable against aircraft tonnage. 
Regulations of United States, 191.!;.-Shortly after the 
declaration of 'Yar in 1914, the United States as a neutral 
issued instructions in regard to :foreign vessels in ports 
of the ·united States. The :follo"ring telegraphic in-
struction ''as sent in early August to the collector o£ 
customs of the port o:f New York: 
"' HaYe representatiYe of each foreign Yessel in your port 
certify to this Department whether she is a merchant Yessel in-
tended solely for the carriage of passengers and freight, exclud-
·ing munitions of war, or whether she is a part of the armed 
force of her nation. This information is for lH1l'l10se of maintain-
ing the neutrality of the United States under recent proclamation 
President. Clearance will be refused in absence of this certificate. 
" ' ".,.ire Department before issuing clearance papers to foreign 
Yessels unless you are satisfied after careful inspection that ship 
bas not n1ade any preparations while in 11ort tending in any way 
to her conversion into a Yessel of war. Taking on abnorn1al 
amount of coal, except in case of colliers, would indicate such 
conYersion. Unpacking of guns already on board would be con-
clusiYe. Painting of Yessel a war color would indicate conYersion. 
It must be clear that she is not to be used for transportation 
recruits or reserYes for a foreign army or navy. This does not 
preYent transportation of passengers in usual sense, as where 
there are women and children and men of different nationalities 
eYen though among them there were a few reserYes "·ithout your 
knowledge. If her passengers are nearly all men nnd practically 
all of snme nationality, clearance cannot be granted. It tnust be 
unquestionable that she has no arms or munitions of war 
aboard.'., (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914 Supp1ement, p. 5D5.) 
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Such instructions had been preceded by a cotntn unica-
ti~n of the British charge d'affaires of August 4, 1914, in 
which he said to the Secretary of State: 
"SIR: His ~Iajesty's Government have been informed that the 
German vessel I(ronprinz lVilheln~ sailed from New York on the 
night of the 3d of August, without passengers, but with a heavy 
load of coal, 7,000 tons, and fitted with t'vo long-range guns. Her 
superstructure had also been painted gray. All these preparations 
were n1ade before the vessel left United States waters. 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that similar preparations 
are being made on board other German vessels, notably the Vater-
land and the Barbarossa, in United States ports, and they will no 
doubt attempt to adopt the same tactics as the Kronprinz Wilheln~. 
"In view of the state of war now existing between Great Britain 
and Germany I have the honour, under instructions from Sir Ed-
ward Grey, to call your 1nost serious attention to the action taken 
in regard to these Yessels and to urge the United States Govern-
ment to take immediate steps to prevent these and other such 
vessels leaving United States waters "·ithout passengers and after 
carrying out such obviously warlike preparations as described 
above, which, when carried out in neutral w,aters, constitute a dis-
tinct breach of the la,vs of neutrality." (Ibid, p. 594.) 
In reply for the Secretary of State, ~1r. Lansing said: 
· "SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your note No. 254 dated 
August 4, 1914, 11 p.m., but presented to the Department on the 
following day, on the subject of the equipment and sailing of the 
Kronprinz Wilheln~ from New York on the night of the 3d instant, 
and of preparations being made on board the German vessels 
Vaterland· and Barbarossa in United States ports. 
"Under instructions from Sir Edward Grey you call my atten-
tion, in view of the state of war existing between Great Britain 
and Germany·, ' to the action taken in regard to these vessels and 
to urge the United States Govern1nent to take immediate steps 
to prevent these and other such vessels leaving United States 
waters without passengers and after carrying out such obviously 
warlike preparations as described above, which, when carried out 
in neutral waters, constitute a distinct breach of the laws of neu-
trality.' 
"In reply I have the honor to inform you that as the instance 
of the Kronprinz Wilhelm occurred, as you say, on the 3d instant 
before the declaration of war with Germany had been issued by 
the British Government, it would appear that the state1nent in 
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~·our last })aragraph quoted aboYe has no application to the case 
of that Yessel. 
''As to the attitude of the United States Government toward 
the other Yessels mentio11e<l in your note I haYe the honor to 
atlYise you that these ye~sels are, and haYe been for ~ome time, 
under the surYeillance of United States authorities with a vie\Vl 
to IH'eYenting a brea('h hy them of the neutrality of the United 
States. The Department is adYise<l that these vessels hnYe not 
as :ret left American waters. 
" "\Yith reference to your statement quoted aboYe as to what in 
the opinion of His Britannic :Majesty's Government may be con-
sidered as constituting a breach of the la\YS of neutrality in cases 
of this character, I have the honor to refer you to my note of the-
lUth instant relating in son1e respects to the rights and duties of 
tl:ie United States as a neutral power during the pending Euro-
p<:an wars." (Ibid. p. 602.) 
LVaval vessel in port.-,Vhile under the 'V ashington 
Treaty of 1922 on Lilnitation of Naval Arinainent, Ar-
ticle XI, there was a restriction upon the construction by 
one of the contracting parties for another contracting 
party of vessels of \var exceeding 10,000 tons clisplace-
nlent, this provision did not apply to non-contracting 
parties. By article 8 of the London Naval Treaty of 
1930, the exe1nption on the ground of tonnage is some-
what further restricted and more definite provisions are 
enumerated as to equipment. 
Though the parties to the specific provisions of the· 
''T ashington and London treaties would be bound by the 
provisions of these treaties and though states not parties 
to these treaties would not be bound by the treaties as 
such, all parties would be bound by the principles of 
international law. 
The rules in regard to intern1nent of vessels of \var 
are coinparatiYely modern rules, and Hague Convention 
XIII, Article 24, provides for internment of a vessel of 
\Yar \Yith its officers and cre\V. '"fhe instructions of states 
in regard to internment usually provide for Yessels of 
\Yar w·hich ha Ye entered neutral ports after the outbreak 
of \Yar. The regulations in regard to sub1narines issued 
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during the 'Vorld 'Var 1nainly contemplated the entrance 
of ar1ned and com1nissioned vessels. 
A vessel which is in a neutral port, completed, armed, 
and paid for by one of the belligerents but not yet 1nanned 
or co1mnissioned may be a potential threat to the other 
belligerent. It n1ight quickly become an instrument of 
war if conveyed outside of neutral jurisdiction and so 
long as it remains within neutral jurisdiction it is safe 
fron1 capture. In order that this protection afforded by 
neutral jurisdiction 1nay not be used by one belligerent 
to the advantage of one as against the other, it has been -
customary to require that neutrals sho'v due diligence in 
supervising activities tending to aid either belligerent 
along certain well-defined lines in furnishing and equip-
ping ships. 
The Somers, 1898.-A torpedo boat, the So1ners, be-
longing to the United States, had, during the 'var with 
Spain in 1898, been stored at Falmouth, England. In 
N oven1ber 1898, after active hostilities had ceased and be-
fore the treaty of peace had been signed, the United States 
desired to bring the Son1ers from England and requested 
per1nission fro1n the British Govern1nent stating that" in 
case of resu1nption of hostilities with Spain this vessel will 
not be 1nade use of." 
After considering the A1nerican proposition, the 
British Govern1nent through the Foreign Office said on 
Dece1nber 8, 1898: 
"In vie\v of this assurance I have the honor to state that Her 
l\Iajesty's Government are glad to comply with your request, and 
that the necessary instructions will at once be sent to the proper 
authorities in order to facilitate the departure of the vessel." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1898, p., 1007.) 
American attitude on subn2arines, 1930.-At the Lon-
don Naval Conference in 1930, the me1nbers of the ..._-\.mer-
iean delegation endeavored by speeches over the radio 
and otherwise to make known, not merely to the Confer-
ence, but to the world at large, their attitude upon ques-
tions before the Conference. The chair1nan of the 
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A1nerican delegation on February 6 stated to the press 
that " Our delegation is in agreement on every ite1n of 
<>ur program", and at the end .of the Conference this was 
reaffirmed. 
~..\..t the plenary ses,sion of the Conference on February 
11, he said: 
"The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a 
weapon particularly susceptible to abuse, that it is susceptible of 
use against merchant ships in a \Vay that violates alike the laws 
of war and the dictates of humanity. The use made of the sub-
marine revolted the conscience of the world, and the threat of its 
unrestricted use against merchant ships was what finally deter-
mined the entry of my country into the conflict. In the light of 
our experience it seems clear that in any future war those who 
employ the submarine will be under strong temptation, perhaps 
irresistible temptation, to use it in the way that is most effective 
for immediate purposes, regardless of consequences. These consid-
erations convince us that technical arguments should be set aside 
in order that the submarine n1ay henceforth be abolished. We 
have come to the conclusion that our problem is, whether in this 
day and age, and after the experiences of the last war, the nations 
at this conference are justified in continuing to build these instru-
ments of warfare, thereby assuming responsibility for the risk of 
repeating in any possible future wars the inhumane activities 
which have been condemned by the verdict of history. 
"It seems to the American Delegation that we have a common 
interest in the abolition of the submarine; first of all, for the pur-
pose of suppressing costly weapons which we can forego by agree-
ment and by the abolition of which we reduce our requirements in 
other classes of ships; and, second, for the purpose of elilninating 
f or the future the dreadful experiences of the past. 
"The American Delegation, therefore, urges that we set aside 
purely technical considerations and give careful study to the possi-
bility of eliminating this \Vhole problem." (Publications of the 
Department of State, Conference Series Xo. 3, pp. 21-22.) 
On the proposition of the French delegation on that 
day, the five powers agreed to place the use of submarines ' 
11nder the same rules as the use o£ surface vessels of war, 
though there has been question as to whether the article 
of the treaty drafted for the purpose accon1plished that 
€ncl. 
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In a radio address on February 16, 1930, Senator Rob-
inson, a 1nember of the A1nerican delegation, stated the 
French proposition as that: 
"all of the nations should agree that hereafter submarines shall 
be forbidden to attack merchant ships, except after visitation and 
search, and provision made for the safety of passengers and crew 
in the same way that international law requires surface vessels 
to do." (Ibid, p. 26.) 
Treaty agreement on rules for submarines, 1930.-The 
London Naval Conference agreed upon rules for the 
conduct of submarines as regards merchant vessels in 
part IV, article 22, which states: 
"The following are accepted ns established rules of Interna-
donal Law: 
" ( 1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines 
rnust conform to the rules of International Law to which surfac-e 
Yessels are subject. 
" (2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to 
stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit 
or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may 
not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel with-
0Ut having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a 
place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not re-
garded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers 
3.nd crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, 
by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which 
i~ in a position to take them on board." 
"The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to 
express their assent to the above rules." (Publications of the De-
partment of State, Conference Series, No. 2, p. 16) 
In a pan1phlet issued in 1930 by the Departlnent of 
State containing a digest of the treaty it was said: 
"Part IV. (This part applies to the United States, Great Britain~ 
France, Italy, and Japan.) 
"ARTICLE 2.2. This article specifies that sub1narines must con-
form to the rules of international law to which surface vessels 
are subject regarding merchant ships, and further provides that 
any warship (whether surface vessel or submarine) must not 
sink or render incapable of navigation, a merchant vessel without 
first having placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a 
place of safety, except when such n1erchant vessel persistently re-
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fuses to stop on being duly summoned or actively resists visit or 
searrh. It also provides that the Inerchant ship's boats are not 
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers 
and crew is assured under existing conditions by the proximity of 
land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to 
take them on board. 
"All the powers not party to the treaty are invited by this article 
to express their assent to the above rules." (Publications of the 
Department of State, Conference Series, No. 4, p. 9.) 
This part of the treaty is to "re1nain in force 'vithout 
Inn it of ti1ne." 
'"rhe earlier rules to "~hich it 1nay be presun1ed this 
article 2:2· refers are in regard to visit and search, though 
in 'Yording this article is con1prehensive and refers to all 
action of " surface vessels " " "~ith regard to 1nerchant 
ships." It is also prestunecl that article 22 in Inentioning 
'~ surface vessels " intended to include all types though 
in preceding articles it has been custo1nary to refer specifi-
cally to "surface vessels of 'Yar " or even " naval surface 
co1nbatant vessels." 
Question 1nay be raised as to action on the part of a 
Iner<.:hant vessel of an enen1y or of a neutral 'vhich n1ight 
constitute "persistent refusal " to stop on being " duly 
sununoned " or " active resistance." 
The instructions for the X a vy of the United States of 
~Tune 1917 state: 
"47. If the summoned vessel resists or takes to flight she may 
be pursued and brought to by forcible measures if necessary." 
T'he lJnitecl States has regarded resistance or flight as 
ground for using force sufficient to cause the 1nerchant 
vessel to lie to for visit and search, but not as ground for 
sinking the vessel. Of course the n1erchant vessel might 
be sunk in the exercise of the right, but the use of force 
'vas held to be restricted to that necessary to bring the 
vessel to, and forcible resistance by the merchant vessel 
'vas not in itself a ground for sinking the 1nerchant vessel, 
but a just ground for its condemnation. 
As by the explanations and re1narks of those negoti-
ating the treaty, the intent ·was to restrict the action of 
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subn1arines in order that they should conform to the ac-
cepted rules for surface vessels under international la,v, 
it 'vould be unwise for any naval officer to be less strict in 
interpretation of the rules of international la 'v in regard 
to the use of force in connection 'vith visit and search 
than prior to 1930. In other 'vords, the 1nerchant vessel 
might be "brought to by forcible n1easures if necessary" 
and such measures should be strictly limited to that end, 
as more extreme action must depend upon other consider-
ations, some of 'vhich may rest upon the results of the visit 
and search for which the n1erchant vessel is brought to. 
Hitherto even in case of flight or " persistent refusal 
to stop " sinking of a merchant vessel 'vould not be 
approved if the vessel could other,vise be ;:;topped, and 
sinking in case of " active resistance " or of resistance 
would be only a last resort. It cannot be prestuned that 
those are in error 'vho " ... ould read the treaty as follow~: 
( 1) In general, in their action with regard to merchant ships, 
submarines must confonn to the rules of International Law to 
which surface vessels are subject, but 
(2) In particular, a warship, whether surface vessel or sub-
marine, rnay not sink or render incapable of navigation a mer-
chant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and. 
ship's papers in a place of safety, except in the case of persistent 
refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to 
visit or search. 
Sending in of seized vessels.-The "sending in" of 
prizes 'vas understood to involve the placing of a prize 
crew on board the vessel seized and the navigating_ of the 
ves;:;el to the nearest convenient prize court, or the escort-
ing o.f the vessel to such port by the capturing vessel. 
Detailed instructions 'vere given for this action. In this 
action the 'viii of the captain 'vas substituted for that of 
the ma;:;ter of the seized vessel and the responsibility 'vas 
correspondingly shifted. 
Gradually, ,vith the abolition of privateering, and the 
increase in size and speed of public and private vessels, 
the " sending in " of seized vessels beca1ne n1uch 1nore of 
a problem. A prize cre,v, if it could be ;:;pared, 1night 
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be unable to control the n1oyements of a 1noclern Yessel 
of large tonnage, and a submarine could not spare a crew. 
Escorting a vessel under n1odern conditions "·here aid 
n1ight be slunmoned by the seized vessel by radio would 
make the escorting perilous. The results of bringing the 
seized vessel in, either as to the material goods con-
demned to the captor, or kept from the other belligerent, 
would ordinarily be slight as compared to the loss of 
time and the risk involved in the operation. 
The risk of attack by sub1narine or other hostile force 
during the "delivering up" of goods at sea has made 
this procedure of doubtful Yalue and expediency in most 
cases. 
It " .. as but natural that other methods should be sug-
gested and resorted to in recent years, when the charac-
ter of vessels of war and of peace had becon1e so unlike 
in n1any respects as compared with those of the early 
nineteenth century. 
Recent practice and suggestions.-Article 48 of the un-
ratified Declaration of London of 1909 e1nbodied the gen-
eral opinion of that period upon the treabnent of neutral 
vessels seized as prize. It said that: 
"A captured neutral \esse! is not to be destroyed by the captor, 
but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determine 
there the rights as regards the Yalidity of the capture." 
Article 49, however, made an exception in regard to a 
vessel which w·ould be liable to conden1nation in case the 
taking in of the seized vessel " would involve danger to 
the ship of war or to the success of the operations in 'vhich 
she is at the ti1ne engaged." In the general report of the 
conference, 'vhich had official ·weight, it was held that 
danger n1ust exist " at the mo1nent when the destruction 
takes place." The arglunent being in part that as the 
ship "·as already practically lost to the owner, being 
liable to condemnation, it 'vould inYolYe no further loss 
to him but "·ould constitute the destruction of belligerent 
property by the belligerent. Article 50 provided for plac-
ing the persons on board and the ship's papers in safety 
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before destruction, and the exceptional e1nergency had 
ahvays to be proved before any suit for condemnation 
'vould have effect, and this 'vas to be proved "in a man-
ner to 1neet the opposition of the neutral"; otherwise com~ 
pensation "\Vas due the neutral. Other liabilities also 
guarded against destruction, and for innocent goods de-
stroyed compensation 1nust be made. There had been 
much discussion of this subject. Lord Sto,vell in 1819 
had declared that destruction could be justified only "by 
a full restitution in value", (The Felicity, 2 Dodson 
Ad1niralty Reports, 381) and there had been a general 
opinion against destruction (1D11 Naval "\Var College, In-
ternational IJa"\V Situations, pp. 51-98). r.rhe Italian 
Governrnent had applied the provisions of the Declara-
tions of London in its war "\vith Turkey in 1911. 
As the Declaration of London 'vas operative only dur-
ing the early W'eeks of the ''Torld "\Var, new considera-
tions arose. 
It 'Yas proposed by son1e that each merchant vessel 
~hould be examined prior to departure :from a port, and 
be certified as to the character and as to the nature o:f 
its cargo, thus putting a heavy burden and responsibility 
upon the neutral. The difficulty of effective enforcement 
o:f any such insurance as to the nature of a cargo was 
often evident during the period while the prohibition 
·of in1portation of alcohol into the United States was in 
force. It was also evident that one of the belligerents 
might be benefited while the other 1night be injured by 
such a rule, and that in some cases 'veak states not ac-
customed to being or not able to be self -sufficient might 
be placed at great relative disadvantage or be put to 
great expense to become self-sufficient in materials essen-
tial in time o:f "\var. 
Sequestration in a neutral port penqing the decision 
G:f a prize court 'vas frequently proposed before and dur-
ing the "\Vorld vVar, and there were some treaties which 
provided for such sequestration. It has been argued 
with so1ne force that during the 'Vorld War the position 
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of Great Britain and its allies w·ould have been strength-
ened if sequestration had been the rule on the ground 
that neutral shipping which "~as sunk 1night have been 
sequestrated :for a time, and innocent cargo and ship-
ping would have been freed. In any case there "·ould 
haYe been less irritation o:f neutrals, and with ships "·hich 
had been sequestra ted in their ports there would be pos-
sibilities o:f bringing pressure upon belligerents disre-
garding the laws o:f war. 
Such a proposition as this, n1ade in regard to seques-
tration. n1ay, as is the case in the proposition in regard 
to certification. be an indirect recognition that destruction 
o:f a seized vessel is approved. Destruction~ according to 
accepted law is unlawful, save under \ery exceptional cir-
cunlstances. ...\.nother and frequently 1nade suggestion 
has been that subn1arines be banned. but this suggestion 
need not be seriously considered while naval treaties enl-
body present provisions. 
The rule as e1nbodied in article 22 of the London X a val 
'J'reaty, 1930~ practically restricts the use o:f the sub-
Jnarine to that o:f a surface cruiser as regards vessels o:f 
co1n1nerce. while leaving the subn1arine unrestricted as 
regards vessels o:f war~ n1aking it once n1ore essential 
that vessels o:f war and vessels o:f con11nerce be clearly 
distinguished and distinguishable. It cannot easily be 
presu1ned that arn1ed merchant ves,sels could be toler-· 
ated "·bile subn1arines should be required to con:fonn to 
article 22. 
Delivery of contraband.-The subject o:f delivery o£ 
contraband at sea was considered at length in Interna-
tional Law Situations, 1911, pages 99-110. It was there 
shown that early treaties pern1itted ma.sters o:f n1erchant 
vessels to " agree, consent, and offer to deliver '' coiltra-
band goods, ''hen the~e :formed a part o:f the cargo, after 
,,·hich they might proceed. 
Gradually, limitations began to be inserted recognizing 
the difficulties o:f delivering cargoes at sea, as in article 
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18 o.f the treaty between the United States and Brazil, 
of 1828, in which it was said: 
" . . . :Xo vessel of either of the two nations shall be de-
tained on the high seas on account of having on board articles of 
contraband, wheneYer the master, captain, or supercargo of said 
Yessels "·in deliYer up the articles of contraband to the captor, 
unless the quantity of such articles be so great and of so large 
a bulk that they cannot be receiYed on board the capturing ship 
without great inconvenience; but in this and all the other cases 
of just detention the vessel detained shall be sent to the nearest 
convenient and safe port, for trial and judgment, according to 
la.w." ( 8 U. S. Statutes, p. 39-!.) 
ProYisions to the sa1ne effect appear in many treaties 
of the nineteenth century, but to,vard the end of the cen-
tury there ''as a growing support for the position that 
prize court proceedings should. be essential in the change 
of title to goods seized as prize. Article 44 of the unrati-
fied Declaration of London, 1909, provided for the de-
liYery of contraband under certain circlunstances if it was 
not of an an1ount sufficient to rnake the Yessel itself liable 
to conde1nnation. Other provisions in regard to delivery 
of contraband at sea "·ere also discussed, _but difficulties 
of a practical nature 'vere often advanced in opposition 
to the extension of the practice by general agree1nent of 
the na Yal powers. 
The actual form upon which the London Naval Confer-
ence agreed in the Declaration of London in 1909 was 
as follo"-rs : 
"ARTICLE 4-!. A vessel stoppe<l becam;;e carrying contraband, and 
not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contra-
band, may, according to circumstances, be allowed to continue 
her voyage if the master is ready to deliv~r the contraband to 
the belligerent ship. 
"The delivery of the contraband is to be entered by the ca11tor 
on the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master of the vessel 
must furnish the captor duly certified copies of all rele"Vant papers. 
"The captor is at liberty to destro~" the contraband ,yhich is thus 
delivered to him." (1909 :Xaval \Var College, International Law 
Topics, p. 95. ) 
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rrhe report of the British delegation to Sir Edward 
Grey showed the course of discussion at the conference, 
.1nd so1ne of the reasons for the adoption of article 44. 
"18. Careful consideration was giYen to the question, raised 
in paragraph 33 of our instructions, whether any sa tisfactor:r 
arrangement could be devised for allowing the imn1ediate removal 
hy the captor of any contraband found on board a neutral Yessel. 
Proposals were put forward by several delegations. The 1nost 
far-reaching one was one submitted by Austria-Hungary, under 
which the neutral Yessel carrying contraband was to be given 
the right to proceed on her way without further 1nolestation if 
the master was ready to hand over the contraband to the captor 
on the spot, a proviso being added which made it necessary that 
tlle subsequent decision of a prize court should intervene in 
(•rder either to validate the transact1on or to decree compensa-
tion where the captor should have been proved to have acted 
wrongfully. In this form, the proposal did not 1neet with gen-
eral support. It was objected that to concede an absolute right 
in the terms to the neutral would constitute an unjustifiable inter-
ference with the legitimate rights of belligerents, and that, Inore-
over, the rule would be found in practice un,vorkable. The Con-
ference therefore fell back upon the cia use now embodied in the 
Declaration as article 44, which goes no further than authorizing 
tbe handing over of contraband, or its destruction, on the spot, 
by common agreement between captor and neutral, subject to the 
subsequent reference of the case to the prize court. It is not 
anticipated that it will be possible to apply this rule in very 
numerous instances, as, under modern conditions of maritime 
con1merce, the transshipment or destruction of cargo on the high 
seas is likely in most cases to present serious or insuperable dif-
fl.culties. But, so far as it goes, the rule may afford a welcome 
measure of relief in favorable circumstances. (Parliamentary 
Papers, :Miscellaneous, No. 4, 1909, International Naval Confer-
ence, Cd. 4554, p. 97.) 
Regulations during the lV orld 1V ar.-The instructions 
to naval officers in the period 1914-1918 and earlier in the 
nineteenth century contain provisions e1nbodying in large 
1neasure the principles of the Declaration of London. 
This is evident in such provisions as the Japanese regula-
tions governing capture at sea of 1914, article 70 of \Yhich 
provides: 
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"A vessel stopped because carrying contraband, and not liable 
to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband, may, 
according to circumstances, be allowed to continue her voyage if 
the master is ready to deliver the contraband to the belligerent 
ship. The delivery of the contraband is to be entered by the 
captor on the log book of the vessel stopped, and the master of 
the vessel must furnish the captor duly certified copies of all 
relevant papers. The captor shall prepare a document in dupli· 
cate according to Form No. 6 with regard to kinds of contraband 
and shall give one copy to the master of the vessel. The captor 
is at liberty to destroy the contraband which is thus delivered 
to him." (1925 Naval War College, International Law Documents, 
p. 166.) 
The Instructions issued by the United States in June 
1917, article 86, provide that "if circumstances preclude 
such delivery of the contraband cargo, the vessel should 
in general be sent in." 
Difficulties of delirvering cargoes at sea.-At the time 
when treaties relating to the delivery of cargoes at sea 
'vere made, fron1 the seventeenth to the middle of the 
nineteenth century, there was a considerable equality in 
size and in other respects between vessels engaged in war 
and vessels engaged in co1nmerce. Often the amount of 
cargo liable to condemnation, if the merchant vessel 
should be taken in, might be insignificant as com pared 
with the whole cargo, or as compared with the expense or 
inconvenience of taking the vessel in even though there 
\vas no question as to the strict right to take the vessel to a 
prize court. \Vith vie'v to meeting such conditions 'vith-
out unduly inconveniencing either party, these early 
treaties inserted such provisions as article 7 of the treaty 
of February 24, 1676-77, bet,veen Great Britain and 
France, which said : 
"If the vessel is laden but in part with contraband goods, and 
the master thereof offers to put then1 in the captor's hands, the 
captor shall not then oblige him to go into any port, but shall suffer 
him to continue his Yoyage." (1911 NaYal 'Var College, Inter-
national Law Situations, p. 100.) 
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It " ·as early recognized that there n1ight be grave risks 
and possibilities of irregularities if delivery of cargo at 
~ea "·as not carefully safeguarded, and later treaties \Vere 
elaborated to 1neet these contingencies. Gradually, such 
treaty provisions becan1e less frequent, but regulations 
for the conduct of naval \Yar even during the ''T orld ''Tar 
provided for delivery of cargo at sea. Son1e of these 
follo\v closely article 44 of the unratified declaration of 
London of lf>09. and provide that the conunander of the 
visiting vessel1nay destroy the contraband \vhich has been 
cJelivered to hin1. 
It \Vas maintained that resort to delivery of contra-
band subjected the visiting vessel to undue risk, as the 
change in conditions due to speed of ves~els, use of radio, 
nnd of sub1narines and other mQdern instrtnnents in war 
rendered the reasons for delivering up of contraband at 
sea no longer valid. Even if this be true, it \vas con-
tended that this did not give one belligerent a right to 
change the la,vs of \Var during the period of \Var. Then 
belligerents began to advance the doc~rine of reprisal as 
bas~ of their acts, disregarding the fact that reprisal 
gave no ground for lin1iting the rights of neutrals, 
though neutrals might be liable to inconvenience or other 
incidental consequences of acts o.f reprisal aimed directly 
at one belligerent by the other. 
" Proceed a3 dh·ected."-In the unratified treaty in 
relation to the use of subn1arines and noxious gases 
in \varfare, dra \Vn up at the ""\~V ashington Conference in 
1922, under article I \Yas the clause: 
"A merchant vessel must not be a ttaeked unlf'SS it rrfuse to 
submit to Yisit and search after warning, or to proceed as di-
rected after seizure.'' 
The Institute of International I~a'v in lf>13 differen-
tiated ~eizure and capture: Seizure in time of war is the 
taking possession of a vessel or goods \Yith or \Vithout the 
n~sent of the master, not necessarily involving bringing 
the n1atter to a prize court; capture implies that the 
authority of the captor is substituted for the authority 
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of the n1aster of the ca pturecl Yes,sel, though the ultimate 
disposition of the vessel and cargo may rest in the prize 
court. The definitions of the Institute imply that seiz-
ure when applied to a cargo may involve detaining the 
Yessel pending decision of the prize court upon the 
liability of the cargo to condemnation. 
There may be exigencies which would justify seizure of 
a neutral merchant Yessel and immediate use of a part or 
the "Thole of its cargo, but these exigencies should be im-
Inecliate and compelling and in such cases inventories 
n1ust be made and care n1ust be taken to aYoid liabilities 
other than for pay1nent for cargo taken. 
Such state1nents as "Tere made in regard to seizures in 
British orders in council during the \Vorlcl \i'\T ar were not 
staten1ents of new,. principles of international la,Y, but of 
\Yhat the British authorities proposed to do or 'vhat they 
had clone "Then neutrals confined their opposition to the 
\Yriting of notes protesting such practices. Referring to 
the period su bseqnent to the Gern1an war zone declara-
tion of Jan nary 3L 1917, the British \Yar Cabinet re-
ported: 
" Two steps were taken to deal with the situation. In the first 
place the Blockade Onler in Coundl of the 16th February, 1917, 
was issued. the effect of whith was to rnake vessels trading to and 
from neutr'al ports in ~urope liable to the risk of capture and con-
demnation if they were found attempting to eYade calling for 
examination at a British port; and, in the second place, it was 
mmonnced through the public press that neutral vessels would, on 
certain conditions, be allowed the privilege of calling for examina-
tion at certain British ports outside the United Kingdom such as 
Halifax in XoYa ·Scotia instead of at l(irkwall, and that British 
bunker conl would only be allowed to those neutral vessels which 
undertook to call at an appointed British port and perfonn certain 
serviee:-; iu return. Concurrently with these rneasures insurance 
on favorable terms was laid open to all vessels engaged in trading 
in the Allied interests, an<.l His 1\Iajesty's Government further 
offered to hire or purehase lart!:e blocks of neutral :-;hip11ing. 
"These expe<lients have, on the whole, worl{ed exceedingly well. 
There has been no serious attempt to break the blockade; and, on 
the other hand, the power to give or refuse what are called Halifax 
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facilities-that is to say, the privilege of being examined outside 
the danger zone-has furnished us with a powerful inducement to 
neutral shipowners to cmnply with the various blockade and ship-
l1ing requirements that 've ha\e put forward." (1918 Naval 'Var 
College, International Law Documents, p. 94.) 
''Thile there 'Yas in internationalla'v no rule requiring 
r~outral vessels voluntarily to go to a belligerent port of 
either belligerent for examination, such action n1ight be 
made advantageous by exempting from liability the ves-
sels 'vhich had conformed to the order, or coal and other 
supplies might be 'vithheld fron1 vessels which had not 
conformed to the order. If neutral vessels proceed to 
belligerent ports for examination for their o'vn conven-
ience or advantage, they cannot complain on account of 
delay or risks encountered. Neither can they complain 
if on reasonable suspicion they are taken in by a prize 
crew or escorted in by a vessel of the belligerent forces. 
The ordering of a neutral merchant vessel to proceed 
to a named port without prize crew or escort is beyond 
the legal competence o.f a belligerent, and the 1nerchant 
vessel incurs no liability for disregarding such order and 
.is under no obligation to agree to proceed by itself to a 
port named by a belligerent vjsiting vessel. 
If the submarine had the right to order the Saba to 
agree to proceed to port Xena of state X under penalty 
o.f being ,sunk, it might be maintained that the submarine 
might by radio transmit such orders to all neutral 
n1erchant vessels at sea., and then sink such as were not 
obeying the order. Manifestly no such practice is up-
held by international law. 
The obligation to "proceed as directed" would there-
fore, ii 'vi thin the lawful rights of belligerents, in1ply 
that the directing force was on board the neutral mer-
chant vessel in_ a priz~ crew or escorting the vessel as by 
an accompanying cruiser. 
Threat by government agent.-The commander of the 
submarine is a government agent of the state. His ,vord 
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js in effect the expression o:f the will o:f his state. State 
X is responsible for the acts o£ the co1nmanders o£ its 
submarines. The master o:f the Saba may know that a 
submarine commander's right to regulate the movements 
o£ a neutral merchant vessel under the circumstances pre-
vailing in the case o:f the Saba are limited to placing a 
prize crew on board, or escorting the Saba to port, thus 
maintaining a continuing effective control. 
The authority o£ the commander of a belligerent vessel 
of war is limited by the degree o:f :force at his disposal. 
I£ he cannot spare a prize crew, or cannot leave the area 
o£ his operations to escort a prize to port, he must release 
the vessel and any action beyond this is in excess o:f his 
la ,v:ful authority, unless permitted by treaty agreement 
to 'vhich the belligerent state and the neutral state con-
('(•rned are parties. The Saba would be under obligation 
by treaty to "deliver up" the contraband. The Saba 
'vould be under no lawful obligation to agree to change 
Its course or to proceed to Xena, nor would an agreement 
1r1ade under such compulsion be valid. 
The commander o:f the submarine has no lawful au-
thority to make or to enforce a threat to sink the Saba 
because it does not agree to change its course and proceed 
to Xena. 
SOLUTION 
(a) The l\1o. 5 'vas on a lawful voyage when met by the 
1' oba. 
The Y oba could seize the No. 5 and bring her to a prize 
court o£ Y. 
Except in the case o£ urgent military necessity conver-
sion before adjudication would not be lawful and in any 
case :full co1npensation must be made :for N's loss. 
(b) The 1.Vo. 5 after installing its equipment in state M 
and sailing :for state X should be brought to a prize court. 
Except in case o:f urgent military necessity conversion 
before adjudication 'vould not be lawful. 
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States X and ~I have no responsibility nor 'vould Y 
have any responsibility as the LVo. 5 is bound for X, a 
belligerent destination. 
(c) The LVo. 6 should be interned by stateR. 
The construction of the LVo. 6 in stateR is la,vful. 
(d) The Saba is under legal obligation to "deliver up " 
the contraband. The Saba is under no legal obligation 
to agree to change its course and to proceed to port Xena, 
though it "·oulcl be under obligation to go if a~contpanied 
by the sub1narine or in control of a prize crew. 
